What Section 1983 is
Section 1983 is the federal statute that lets a person sue a police officer, a jail official or another government actor for money when that actor, using the authority of a state or local government, took away a right the Constitution or a federal law protects. It does not create rights. It gives a way to enforce rights that already exist. Two elements, one sentence, and a century and a half of decisions about what the sentence means.
Current as of September 2026. We re-check this page every quarter and after any change in the law.
Every page on this site comes back to one sentence in the United States Code. If you were arrested without cause, hit when you were not resisting, charged on a report an officer made up, or hurt in a cell, the claim you have is a Section 1983 claim, and the questions that decide it are the questions this sentence raises: was a federal right taken away, and was the person who took it acting with the authority of the state. This page reads the statute, names its two elements, and explains the pieces that travel with it: the fee statute, the conspiracy statute, who counts as a person, and which court hears the case. The law page sorts the rest.
The text
Section 1983 makes liable "every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State" subjects "any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" (42 U.S.C. § 1983). The person who did it is liable to the person injured. That is the whole mechanism, and every police abuse case brought in federal court is brought through it.
The two elements
Read the sentence again and it splits in two. A plaintiff has to prove, first, that the defendant acted under color of state law, and second, that the defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal law. Everything else in a Section 1983 case is a defense, a question of who can be sued, or a question of what the case is worth.
The first element is rarely contested when the defendant is an on-duty police officer, a correction officer or a jail medical provider working for a city or a state. An officer making an arrest is using the authority the state gave him. The color of law page goes through the cases where the element is less obvious, and the one case where it fails outright: the State itself is not a "person" who can be sued for damages under the statute (Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)).
The second element is where the case is fought. Section 1983 does not say what rights it protects; it points to the Constitution and to federal statutes. In a police case the right is nearly always the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, which covers an arrest without probable cause, a search without a warrant or an exception, a stop without reasonable suspicion, and force that was more than the situation called for. For a person held before trial the right is the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection, and for a convicted prisoner it is the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. An arrest made because of what you said or filmed adds the First Amendment. The claims page sorts the claims by what happened and links to the page that goes through each right's elements.
What Section 1983 does not do
It does not turn every police rule into a federal right. A violation of a department's patrol guide is not, by itself, a constitutional violation. Nor is every violation of a Supreme Court rule: the Court held in Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134 (2022), that a Miranda violation is not itself a constitutional violation actionable under Section 1983. The claim has to be tied to a right the Constitution or a federal statute actually secures.
Who is a "person" who can sue
The statute protects "any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof." That second phrase is deliberate, and the Supreme Court read it plainly in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982): "Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person.'" A person without immigration status who is arrested without cause or beaten in a cell has the same Section 1983 claim as a citizen. What an arrest does to an immigration case is a separate and serious question, and the immigration status page goes through it.
Who is a "person" who can be sued
Three answers, and they decide the shape of every case. An individual officer is a person and can be sued in his personal capacity for damages. A city, county, town or village is a person too, but the Supreme Court held in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that a municipality is not liable simply because its employee violated the Constitution; it is liable only where its own policy or custom caused the violation. The Monell page explains what that takes. And a State and its agencies are not persons at all: a state official sued in his official capacity for damages is the State, and the claim fails, though the same official can be sued in his personal capacity (Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). That is why a case against a New York State Trooper or a state prison guard names the officer, not the State, and why the state-law claim against the State goes to the Court of Claims instead.
Section 1983 also stops at the federal line. Its text reaches action under color of the law "of any State," and a federal officer, an ICE agent, a Border Patrol agent, a deputy marshal, acts under federal law. The ICE and federal officers page explains the two routes that remain: what is left of Bivens after Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), and the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The statutes that travel with it
Section 1988: fees, and the gaps state law fills
Section 1983 says nothing about attorney's fees. Section 1988 does: in a Section 1983 action the court "may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs" (42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)). A fee award is paid by the defendants and is separate from the damages. Section 1988(a) does a second job: where federal law is silent on a question, it borrows state law to fill the gap, so long as the state rule is not inconsistent with federal law. The most important gap it fills is what happens to a claim when the person dies; the Supreme Court held in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978), that survival of a Section 1983 claim is governed by state survivorship law through § 1988(a). The damages and fees page goes through fees; the death in custody page goes through survival.
Sections 1985(3) and 1986: conspiracy, and knowing about one
Two neighbors of Section 1983 cover a conspiracy. Section 1985(3) makes a conspiracy to deprive a person or a class of persons of the equal protection of the laws actionable. Section 1986 goes one step further: a person who knows of such a conspiracy, has the power to prevent it, and fails to do so is liable too. Section 1986 carries its own limitation period of one year, far shorter than the Section 1983 period, which is one reason a conspiracy theory has to be identified early (42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3), 1986).
How long you have
Section 1983 has no limitation period of its own. The Supreme Court held in Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989), that a Section 1983 claim borrows the state's general or residual personal injury period. In New York that is the three-year period of CPLR 214(5), not the one-year period for intentional torts. In New Jersey it is two years (N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2). In Florida it is four years (Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3); Doe v. Swearingen (11th Cir. 2022)). No notice of claim is required for the federal claim in any of them (Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988)). When the clock starts depends on the claim, and the deadlines page has the table.
The federal clock is the long one
The state-law claims that travel with a Section 1983 claim have far shorter clocks: a notice of claim within 90 days in New York and New Jersey. Losing them does not lose the federal claim, but it loses the direct claim against the City. The notice of claim page goes through the rule; the state-law claims page goes through what those claims add.
Which court hears it
A Section 1983 claim can be filed in state court or federal court. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the claim, and the Supreme Court held in Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009), that New York could not strip its own courts of Section 1983 damages suits against correction officers. A case filed in state court does not always stay there: a defendant may remove it to federal court within 30 days of receiving the pleading (28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)). In practice most police abuse cases against New York City defendants are filed in federal court, with the state-law claims attached, and the filing page explains the choice.
The federal courts are organized in circuits, and the circuit's published decisions are the ones that decide whether a right was "clearly established" for qualified immunity. New York is in the Second Circuit, New Jersey in the Third, and Florida in the Eleventh (28 U.S.C. § 41). The same arrest can be judged by different precedent depending on where it happened, which is one reason the qualified immunity page is built around published cases on similar facts.
| Statute | What it does | Number to know |
|---|---|---|
| 42 U.S.C. § 1983 | The cause of action: deprivation of a federal right under color of state law | Borrows the state personal injury period: 3 years NY, 2 NJ, 4 FL |
| 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) | Attorney's fees to the prevailing party | Discretionary, paid by the defendants |
| 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) | Borrows state law to fill gaps, such as survival after death | Robertson v. Wegmann |
| 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3), 1986 | Conspiracy to deny equal protection; knowing of one and failing to prevent it | One year under § 1986 |
| 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) | Removal of a state-court case to federal court | 30 days from receipt of the pleading |
| 28 U.S.C. § 41 | The circuits | NY: Second. NJ: Third. FL: Eleventh |
If a charge is pending
A Section 1983 claim and a criminal charge from the same arrest are about the same few minutes, and what you say about them in one case is evidence in the other. If a charge is pending, talk to your defense lawyer before describing the arrest to anyone, including us; the criminal case and civil case page explains why, and why a plea can close a civil claim.
Under color of law
Officers on duty, special patrolmen, the State that cannot be sued, and the federal officers the statute does not reach.
Color of law →Qualified immunity
"Clearly established," the 2026 Supreme Court decisions, the pending bills, and what actually defeats the defense.
Qualified immunity →Which right was violated
The claims sorted by what happened: arrest, force, prosecution, custody.
The claims →Common questions
Does Section 1983 give me a right to sue for any police misconduct?
No. It gives a cause of action only for the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal law, by someone acting under color of state law. Rudeness, a mistake that did not violate the Constitution, or a violation of a department rule is not a Section 1983 claim by itself. A Miranda violation, for example, is not one either. The claims pages go through which rights are most often at stake: the Fourth Amendment for arrests, searches and force, the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments for people in custody.
I am not a citizen. Can I still sue?
Yes. The statute protects any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof, and the Supreme Court held in Plyler v. Doe that a person's immigration status does not change the fact that the person is a person. The immigration status page explains what an arrest can do to an immigration case, which is a separate question.
Do I sue in state court or federal court?
Either. State courts hear Section 1983 claims alongside federal courts, and a case filed in state court can be removed to federal court by the defendants within 30 days of receiving the pleading. Most of our cases are filed in federal court in Brooklyn or Manhattan with the state-law claims attached. The filing page explains the choice.
Who pays my lawyer?
Two sources. Our fee is a contingency fee, a percentage of what is recovered, confirmed in a written retainer before we begin. And in a Section 1983 case the court may award the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b), paid by the defendants. The retainer explains how a fee award is treated. The damages and fees page has the rest.
Tell us what happened.
One conversation with an attorney, in your language. We tell you which claims the facts support, which deadline runs first for the agency involved, what evidence to preserve this week, and whether a pending criminal case changes the timing. If it is not a case we can take, we say so and tell you where to go.
(718) 484-7510If a criminal charge is still open, talk to your defense lawyer before you describe the arrest to anyone, including us. English, Russian and Spanish in-house; an interpreter for any other language. Contingency fee, confirmed in writing before we begin.